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TRUSTEE'S POWER: THE POWER TO SELL
INCLUDES THE POWER TO OPTION
Michael H. Dessent*
The interpretation of a trust instrument executed decades
earlier raises a problem for trustees and courts that is common
to other areas of the law, of balancing an early rationale with
contemporary economic realities.' Less dramatic than the well-
publicized changes in criminal-constitutional law and torts, but of
substantial financial significance, is the question of whether a
trustee, who has been given the power to sell trust real property,
also has the power to option that property.2 Even if the power to
sell does carry with it the power to option, when may such an
option be granted, and under what terms and conditions?
To establish a framework for such an analysis, let us take the
following hypothetical language as a starting point:
The trustee shall have and retain possession of and title to all
property of every description coming within the terms of this
trust and shall control, manage, sell, invest and reinvest and
deal with the same in such manner and form as he shall deem
advisable.3
I. EARLY APPROACH: RATIONALE AND CURRENT EFFICACY
Assume that a trustee was given the power to sell, as set out
hypothetically above, and he granted an option for the purchase
of trust real property. Early courts viewed this act as invalid
because it was not an exercise of the power to sell but a surrender
* B.S., Northwestern University School of Business; J.D., Northwestern University,
School of Law; Member of Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, San Diego, California.
1. As examples, consider the trend toward strict liability in products liability cases
and the abandonment of the privity rule, presaged by Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel of Privity, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960), and the recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in the criminal-constitutional law field. E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Many trust instruments, of course, do not provide the trustee with a power to sell
or dispose of trust property. Given the strict interpretation of trust documents used by
most courts, in such cases the power to option, if not specifically expressed, would not be
implied.
3. Assimilated from the trust provisions involved in Trogden v. Williams, 144 N.C.
192, 56 S.E. 865 (1907); Moore v. Trainer, 252 Pa. 367, 97 A. 462 (1916); and Cardons
Estate, 278 Pa. 153, 122 A. 234 (1923).
TR USTEE'S PO WER
of it for the period of option.' They reasoned that an option bound
the trustee to sell for the price stated without exercising discretion
at the time of sale; it disregarded a possible increase in value of
the property between the beginning and the expiration of the
option.5 The mere fact that consideration was paid for the option
had no affect on the basic principle itself.6
Even a short-term 90 day option was struck down as being
at least temporarily destructive of the power to sell. 7 The reason
was-during the 90 day period, the power to sell was suspended,
and the trustee had no right to accept an offer to buy the land
however advantageous it might be.8
This rationale was taken one step further in two recent cases.
Both held that an option granted by trustees was invalid when
they were given only the power to sell, regardless of whether the
purchase price was set at the time the option was given or to be
fixed by appraisal at the time it was exercised.9 The courts set
forth the traditional reasons; the option suspended the power to
sell during that period, and when the testator conferred the power
of sale he contemplated that the trustee would exercise discretion
at the time of sale and not at some prior moment. 0 Similarly,
courts have reasoned that where a trustee has a power to sell or
lease trust property, he cannot properly give a lease accompanied
by an option to purchase."
Perhaps the most definitive analysis of this problem was
made by the court in Equitable Trust Co. v Delaware Trust Co.'
In that case the trustee was not expressly given specific power to
grant options. However, it proceeded to grant an option for the
life of the optionee and for six months after her death, if exercised
by the representative of her estate. After examining most of the
4. Moore v. Trainer, 252 Pa. 367, 97 A. 462 (1916); In re Armory Board, 29 Misc.
174, 60 N.Y.S. 882 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 190, comment k at 422 (1959) provides:
"The reason is that when a power of sale is conferred it is usually contemplated that the
trustee can exercise discretion at the time of the sale and not at some prior time."
6. Trogden v. Williams, 144 N.C. 192.56 S.E. 865 (1907).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 203, 56 S.E. at 868.
9. Adler v. Adler, 216 Ga. 553, 118 S.E.2d 456 (1961); Equitable Trust Co. v.
Deleware Trust Co., 30 Del. Ch. 118, 54 A.2d 733 (Ct. of Ch. 1947).
10. Id.
I1. In re Armory Board, 29 Misc. 174, 60 N.Y.S. 882, 888 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Moore
v. Trainer, 252 Pa. 367, 97 A. 462 (1916).
12. 30 Del. Ch. 118, 54 A.2d 733 (Ct. of Ch. 1947).
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cases on this subject, the court found that generally a fiduciary
with a mere power of sale is not authorized to grant an option to
buy the property even though the price is to be fixed by subsequent
appraisal. 13 The court remarked that the prevailing rationale for
this view was that since the fiduciary is usually expected to use
his best judgment and discretion with respect to the adequacy of
price at the time of the exercise of the power of sale, he cannot
do so at some prior time when values might have been quite
different. 4
Nevertheless, the Delaware court held itself open to evidence
which might have shown some economic advantage accruing to
the trust estate and to the beneficiaries from the granting of an
option.15 Specifically, the court held that the option to purchase
realty was not binding on the trustee in its case because it was not
shown that any substantial economic gain passed to the trust
estate from the option contract."
This was the first judicial expression of an awareness of the
changing economic factors present in the purchase of real
property, particularly for commercial purposes. 7 When coupled
with certain earlier decisions discussed below, the reasoning in
Equitable Trust Co., though dealing with a long term option,
actually presents a persuasive argument for a modern court to
hold that the power to sell may carry with it the power to option,
at least for a short period of time.1
II. MODERN TREND: REASONING AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
EARLY APPROACH
In advocating the presence of a modern trend on this
question, it must be admitted that there are only a relatively few
cases" that have considered whether or not the power to sell trust
13. Id. at 125, 54 A.2d at 736.
14. Id. at 126, 54 A.2d at 737.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 127, 54 A.2d at 737.
17. Even as late as 1959, however, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 190,
comment k (1959) read as follows:
Where by the terms of the trust a power of sale is conferred upon the
trustee, it is ordinarily not proper for the trustee to give an option to purchase
the property, whether the purchase price is fixed at the time of giving of the
option or is to be fixed by appraisal at th6 time of the exercise of the option.
18. See Cozad v. Johnson, 171 N.C. 637, 89 S.E. 37 (1916) (dictum that a trustee
may give a 60-day option despite an express power to option).
19. See Bernheim v. Stark, 9 Ohio App. 40 (1918), for an unusual interpretation of
an early case.
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property carries with it the power to option.§ Those cases that
have dealt with the problem, however, have explored arguments
on both sides of this issue witt. careful reasoning, and have laid
the framework for a new approach based upon current economic
realities in the purchase and sale of real property.21
The court in Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. 22 was
confronted with language which is similar to the hypothetical trust
provision set forth above. Based upon this power the trustees
granted a three and one-half month option to purchase a large
quantity of stock. The beneficiary sought to invalidate the option.
The court evaluated the approach of earlier courts, but drew a
careful distinction between an option that is simply incidental to
a long term lease and a short term option that is the only
advantagous way to effectuate a sale of trust property.? In most
of the earlier cases, reasoned the court, the option was simply an
ancillary part of a long term lease of trust real property. Further,
in most of those early cases, the trustee's chief purpose in giving
an option was not to bring about a sale of the property, nor was
giving an option the only way in which a sale could have been
brought about. 24 In the previous cases, the option was given
incident to a long term lease, thereby tying up the property for
an extended period of time.?1 With this precedent, a trustee with
only the power to sell could consider a series of factors in
determining whether or not an option to purchase real property
would be held valid. 6 One of the primary factors was whether or
20. See, e.g., Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 313 Mo. 552, 281 S.W. 744 (1926);
Meek v. Bennie, N.Z.L.R. 1 (1940); Crown Co. v. Cohn, 88 Ore. 642, 172 P. 804 (1918).
These cases form the basis for comment k to RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF TRUSTS § 190
(1959) which reads: "Under some circumstances, however, it may be proper for the trustee
to give such an option, as where it is prudent to do so and the sale could not otherwise be
advantageously made."
21. Two early cases stating the general rule have been distinguished on this question
by Loud v. St. Louis Union, 313 Mo. 552, 281 S.W. 744 (1926). The court stated: "Moore
v. Trainer seems to have been somewhat shaken by the later case of Cardons Estate. 278
Pa. 153 (1923)." Id. at 599, 281 S.W. at 755. On the basis of Cozad v. Johnson, Trogden
v. Williams, was not an absolute rule.
22. 313 Mo. 552, 281 S.W. 744 (1926).
23. Id. at 598, 281 S.W. at 755.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The court in St. Louis Union Trust examined the major terms and conditions of
the sale before it and held:
While the question is not entirely free from doubt, nevertheless, after an
exhaustive review and analysis of the many cited authorities dealing thereon,
we have arrived at the conclusion that the defendant, under the powers
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not the giving of an option was a technique to accomplish a sale
of the property or whether it was simply incidental to a long term
lease. The duration of the option was a significant factor in
determining whether or not the motive of the trustee was to sell
or simply tie up the property through an extended tenancy.27 In
addition, the trustee could evaluate whether or not an option was
the only way in which a sale could have been brought about.2 8 It
is this factor which has primary significance in view of the
economic and legal studies which must be made by a buyer in a
modern purchase of real property.
III. CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC REALITIES
The first eight and a half years of this decade have been
characterized, in part, by an expansive and rapid development of
large tracts of real estate throughout the country-. Commercial
parcels are purchased in quantities of dozens of acres for
devel6pment as vast regional shopping centers. Residential
acreage is used for thousands of homes constructed as
autonomous communities under such appealing names as
Whispering Palms, La Jolla Shores Heights and Del Mar Hills.
Yet the development of these vast parcels is preceded by a period
of economic investigation which in many cases is equal to and
often exceeds the period from construction to occupancy.
As an initial proposition, the promoters or syndicates which
are developing a particular area must arrange their financing,
both interim and take-out. The construction loan is placed, almost
universally, with a lending institution diff6rent from that which is
making the permanent loan for the property; the negotiations with
each lender are lengthy and complex.
Before the loans can be arranged, the promoters must be sure
that the proposed use of the land conforms to existing zoning
conferred upon it under the Blanke Will had the mediate right and power to
give the Walker option.
Id. at 603, 281 S.W. at 757.
27. "Under such circumstances, we believe that the defendant was justified in
resorting to the ordinary and usual method of giving an option for a comparatively short
time and at an apparently then reasonably price . I... ld  at 603, 281 S.W. at 757.
28. This test was examined by Scott in his treatise, 2 A. SCOTT, LAW OF
TRUSTS § 190.8 (2d ed. 1950), in the following language: "This is not, however, an
absolute rule and may be departed from when the circumstances justify such a departure.
Thus where the sale could not otherwise be advantageously made, it has been held proper
to give such an option."
[Vol. 7
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ordinances and other regulations. Frequently zoning variances
must be obtained to permit the intended use. Exchanges of zoning
classifications of different properties, for example, from
residential to commercial and vice versa, are not uncommon.
Hearings before planning commissions and committees must be
held; in many cases appearances before city councils are necessary
in order to obtain the right to proceed with construction as
planned.
The promoters must begin arranging for the furnishing of
utility services and roads, and perform preliminary grading,
offsite and engineering work. A subdivision map must be prepared
and filed with the county recorder to comply with the appropriate
statutes.
Concurrently with these investigations, the promoters must
engage in marketing research to determine the appropriate
methods of construction, types of homes or nature of stores if it
is a shopping center. Negotiations must be initiated with
prospective shopping center tenants. In most cases, leases with
large commercial institutions take a substantial period of time
from the period of negotiation to final execution and approval by
the home office. Several months may be involved simply in
waiting for house counsel and committees to give final approval
to the lease document. Moreover the promoters must plan their
advertising and public relations well in advance of construction,
in the face of heavy competition.
With these economic realities in mind, there are two methods
by which the purchase of trust real property for commercial
purposes could be accomplished. The proposed buyer could give
separate consideration for an option agreement, giving him time
to make the necessary investigations, and perform the preliminary
work.29 Alternatively, he could enter into a purchase and sale
agreement and carry out its terms by means of an escrow."
Essentially the escrow provides the buyer with the same basic
features as the option agreement.3' The buyer would place a small
deposit into the escrow at its inception.32 Both of these agreements
29. Berman v. Kenner, 85 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1948); McGuire v. Andres, 259
Ala. App. 109, 65 So. 2d 185 (1953).
30. Wilkinson v. Lanterman, 314 Mich. 568, 22 N.W.2d 827 (1946); McEnaney v.
Spedick, 13 N.J. Super. 37, 80 A.2d 237 (1951).
31. Zora Realty Co. v. Green, 60 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Watts v. England,
168 Ark. 213, 269 S.W. 585 (1925).
32. Called by various names, e.g. good faith deposit, earnest money, commitment fee.
Each term, however, has somewhat different legal implications.
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would be subject to contingencies which permitted the purchaser
to withdraw from the transaction if investigations revealed that
the purchase would be uneconomical.
From the point of view of the trust, an escrow problem is
presented when the buyer decides not to complete the transaction;
most courts would not enforce the claim made by the trustees for
the money which the buyer had deposited. Retention of this
deposit by the seller is ordinarily considered to be a forfeiture and
is unenforceable.3
Accordingly, if money were deposited in an escrow and the
buyer decided not to complete the purchase, the trustees would
have done a disservice to the trust; they would have entered into
a transaction in which they could not retain this money, yet lose
the right to sell the land during the period of the escrow. Based
upon existing law, if the trustees open an escrow. with a buyer,
because of their fear that an option would not be enforceable, they
would have to return the deposit when the buyer cancels. This
would subject them to suit by the beneficiaries to surcharge or
remove the trustees.
On the other hand, the use of an option permits the trustees
to retain the money if the buyer does not wish to complete the
sale.34 The money paid to the seller is solely in consideration for
granting the option.35 Thus, the trustees would be acting in the
best interest of the trust estate by asking for an option since they
would at least be entitled to retain the initial deposit under that
form of agreement.
The power to option is also an important business tool for
the trustees because it gives the buyer of commercial real property
time to employ engineers and surveyors to compute the exact
number of net usable acres in the tract. Acreage computation in
many states is based upon the surveys made in the 1800's, and
buyers have found from examining large tracts, of land in many
states that surveying techniques employed prior to 1900 often
resulted in errors in computation of acreage. If there is no recent
survey of the property, it is essential for the buyer to obtain a
more accurate survey of the parcel.
33. Metz v. Kennedy Inv. Co., 118 Fla. 708, 160 So. 5 (1935); Greenbach Bros., Inc.
v. Burns, 245 Cal. App. 2d 767, 54 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1966).
34. Jones-Short Motor Co. v. Bolin, 153 Wash. 198, 279 P. 395 (1929); Ritucci v.
Brandt, 134 Conn. 364, 54 A.2d 728 (1948).
35. Fruhling v. Ellis, 143 Colo. 162, 352 P.2d 656 (1960); Lanham v. Reimann, 177
Ore. 193, 160 P.2d 318 (1945).
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The economic feasibility of the purchase also depends upon
the availability of outside credit and financing for the project.
Based upon these preliminary examinations by engineers and
surveyors, the financial backers of the project would be presented
with evidence upon which to make their investment decision.
These economic realities have been recognized only once by
a court, in Meek v. Bennie." But the reasoning expressed in that
decision has a general application today.3 In Meek, the trustees
had been given powers such as those phrased in the hypothetical
language above. The plaintiff trustees granted a series of options
to the defendants, totalling eight and one-half months. The
trustees sued to enforce the terms of the option, and were
immediately confronted with the charge that the transaction was
invalid.
The court began with the basic proposition that the trustees
have a duty to get the best price for the trust estate, and must sell
the property under such conditions as would secure the optimum
return. 8 The court found that the earlier cases were not authority
for the proposition that the granting of an option to purchase by
a trustee is wrong in every case.39 If that were so, it reasoned, then
an option from a trustee for one day or one week would be invalid
even if it were impossible to sell the property unless a prospective
purchaser had time to inspect the property or arrange his
financing."
Certainly the experience of trustees in administering large
pieces of commercial property gives them a considerable expertise
in the requirements for bringing about a sale of that land.41 The
court recognized this point and concluded that it is common
experience that the prospective purchaser of commercial property
must arrange financing (incurring considerable expense for plans,
drawings and other preliminary work) and nobody is willing to
undertake that risk without an option.12
36. Having heard the evidence from the trustees that an option was the only means
by which a sale of their commercial property could be effectuated, the court in Meek v.
Bennie, [1940] N.Z.L.R. I concluded: "If such be the position, and the case so states, then
the only reasonable course for the plaintiffs to take would be to give an option for such a
time as would enable the purchaser to satisfy himself that it would be profitable to acquire
the property and arrange his finance."
37. Id.
38. Id. at 6.
39. Meek v. Bennie, [1940] N.Z.L.R. 1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 7.
19703
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IV. TEST FOR THE TRUSTEE'S CONDUCT AND THE BURDEN OF
PROOF
Most states have statutes which set forth the standard to be
used for determining whether or not conduct by a trustee in the
use of trust property is proper.43 Those who challange the conduct
of a trustee have the burden not only of going forward with the
evidence but of proving that the trustee acted in bad faith or
fraudulently.44
As a general proposition, the courts have stated that a trustee
has all the authority necessary to carry out the objects and
purposes of the trust.45 This is true even though the instrument
creating the trust may not directly confer upon him such power.46
Certainly the exercise of discretionary power by a trustee is
subject to control by the courts if it is not reasonably exercised.
In applying this control, however, the courts will not substitute
their own judgment for that of the trustee or interfere with the
exercise of his power except on a showing of an abuse of
discretion ."
The philosophy used by a court, in examining abuse of
discretion by a trustee who exercises a specifically designated trust
power, is that it will not invalidate the decision of the trustee
without a showing of fraud, collusion or bad faith. In determining
whether or not the trustee acted in bad faith or fraudulently, it
has been held that poor business judgment is not the equivalent
of bad faith. 8 The reason for this approach is obvious. Courts
generally lack the expertise and economic information concerning
the particular property involved or the nature of the investigations
that a buyer must undertake, particularly in purchases of large
amounts of realty, before he is certain that his proposed use of
the property can be accomplished.49
43. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2261 (West 1954):
In investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, selling and
managing property for the benefit of another, a trustee shall exercise the
judgment and care, under the circumstances then prevailing, which men of
prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of their own
affair. ...
44. In re Canfield's Estate, 180 Cal. App. 2d 443, 451, 181 P.2d 732, 737 (1947).
45. In the context of a trustee's grant of an option to buy trust property, see Union
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Alter, 103 Ohio St. 188, 132 N.E. 834 (1921) for this
proposition.
46. Craven v. Dominquez Estate Co., 72 Cal. App. 713,237 P. 821 (1925).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 at 402.
48. Estate of Canfield, 80 Cal. App. 2d 443, 181 P.2d 732 (1947).
49. Union Savings Bank& Trust Co. v. Alter, 103 Ohio St. 188, 132 N.E. 834 (1921).
[Vol. 7
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V. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE COURTS
The general rule that the express power to sell does not imply
a power to option must be tempered by the exigencies of modern
economic realities. This rule was developed in cases in which the
option was incidental to a long term lease. The primary purpose
of the option was not to effectuate a sale but to induce the making
of the lease."1 The cases which have made this distinction exhibit
a technique of analysis by which the validity of the option is
evaluated according to its economic merits rather than by a
dogmatic application of the general rule.12
A trustee who is unable to grant an option for a short period
is precluded from exercising a vital business device for the transfer
of property. 3 It is precisely because buyers of large amounts of
real property must undertake sophisticated economic, legal and
financial studies before knowing whether or not to carry out the
purchase that an option is necessary. If the trustee cannot give the
buyer this time, he has lost the possible sale. If the trustee is
unable to sell the property by other means, he faces the threat of
surcharge or dismissal by the beneficiaries for wasting trust assets
because he failed to take advantage of the offers which were made
in the form of options.
It may be possible for a trustee to obtain the consent of all
of the beneficiaries to the proposed transaction. In many cases,
this is not feasible due to the vast number of beneficiaries and the
provisions of the trust benefiting those yet unborn. Certain states
allow a trustee to petition for instructions to undertake a certain
type of transaction not specifically provided for in the
50. The current use of the general rule is discussed in G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 741 (2d ed. 1960).
English legislature gave a trustee in a trust for sale the power to give an option
to purchase. It is believed that American courts should hold the grant of an
option to buy within the terms of a power to sell, where reasonably necessary
to effect a sale at an advantage. Ordinarily probably the grant of an option is
not requisite to the employment of the power of sale, and held invalid but, if
the choice is between a practical inability to sell at all and the giving of an
option to buy which may produce a sale at a fair figure, the courts will
construe the power to sell to include the option element.
51. In re Armory Board, 29 Misc. 174, 60 N.Y.S. 882 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Trogden v.
Williams, 144 N.C. 192, 56 S.E. 865 (1907); and Moore v. Trainer, 252 Pa. 367, 97 A.
462 (1916).
52. Nelson v. American Trust Co., 104 N.J. Eq. 594, 146 A. 460 (Ct. of Ch. 1929);
Northwestern Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. E. Henry Wemme Endowment Fund, 159 Ore.
415, 80 P.2d 881 (1938).
53. Crown Co. v. Cohn, 88 Ore. 642, 172 P. 804 (1918).
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instrument. 4 Nevertheless, such a suggestion does not avoid the
basic conflict between the traditional restrictive interpretation of
trust powers to prevent the trustee from speculating with trust
assets, and the right of the trustee to engage in economic
transactions necessitated by modern conditions.
It would be the court's decision whether or not the trustee
possessed the power to option by the terms of the trust instrument,
and if so, whether or not he should have exercised it. Certainly
this method of determining the trustee's power is undersirable,
and is detrimental to the trustee and the trust estate. Litigation
between the beneficiaries and trustee may occur if the trustee,
having only a power to sell, concludes that he cannot grant an
option, and opens an escrow. If the buyer cancels the purchase,
and the trustee is unable to retain the deposit as a forfei-
ture, the estate has lost this money and has been prevented
from selling to anyone else during the escrow period.55 The
disadvantages to the trust estate which result if the trustee is
unable to exercise the power to option seriously outweigh the
threat of an abuse of power by a trustee who may attach an
option as an incident to a long term lease.
A court which was unwilling to make a determination that
the economic realities involved in the modern purchase of real
estate demand that the granting of an option by a trustee is
prudent and reasonable, could take the larger step by upholding
such a transaction on the ground that the express powers of sale
and disposition contained in the trust instrument imply a power
to grant options in all cases. 6 A trustee having a power of sale
conferred by the trust instrument may be considered to have the
right to grant an option to purchase as one of the ordinary
methods of sale. In virtually all cases, a trustee has been given
general power to perform and act in the best interests of the estate.
It can be argued that the settlor intended to give his trustee all
authority which is necessary for carrying out these purposes.57
54. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2261(4) (West 1954).
55. Crawford v. Allen, 189 N.C. 434, 127 S.E. 521 (1925); Schwartz v. Levy, 337
Ill. App. 293, 85 N.E.2d 859 (1949).
56. Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Ingalls, 177 F.Supp. 151 (S.D. Ala. 1959) upheld the
validity of a 14-month option granted by trustees to buy corporate stock on both grounds.
The court said that the express powers imply a power to grant options and that the
economic realities of the situation called for the granting of an option. The operative
provisions of the trust instrument were similar to the hypothetical language above. Id. at
164-66.
57. After holding that the power to sell implied a power to option, the court in Ingalls
[Vol. 7
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Accordingly, the power to option can be considered an ordinary
and usual method of business operation falling within the scope
of the general powers in the trust. s
The language in most trust instruments, such as that
hypothetically set forth above, will go beyond giving a power to
sell, and also will grant a power such as "to deal with the same
in such manner and form as he in his discretion shall deem
adviseable."59 While these words may be considered surplusage by
some courts, the more reasonable approach would be to consider
that the settlor had in mind broadening the powers of the trustee
by their use.6"
Obviously the court must construe the trust instrument in
accord with the settlor's intent.61 In doing so, it should read all
parts as portions of an integrated whole, in attempting to give
effect to it as a harmonious document. Words such as "deal with
the same in such manner and form as he in his discretion shall
deem advisable" can be considered to authorize and include the
power to do additional acts in connection with the power to sell.62
To hold otherwise would take away from such words any meaning
or force, and would relegate their purpose to nothing more than
a restatement of the power to sell. It is reasonable to infer that
the settlor would not have included this additional language had
he not intended them to have some vitality. 63 It is submitted that
by permitting trustees tQ option trust property when they have a
power to sell, would be carrying out the settlor's intent had he
lived.
stated: "The general rule advanced by the (plaintiff) assurfies a lack of express power to
grant an option, and is not an absolute one, and may be departed from when the
circumstances justify such departure." Id. at 166.
58. Loud v. St. Louis Trust Co., 213 Mo. 552, 281 S.W. 744 (1926).
59. See note 3, supra.
60. On this point, the court in Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 313 Mo. 552,
281 S.W. 744 (1926) stated:
Opposing plaintiff's contention, defendant maintains that where the authority
is general to perform and carry out a particular object, a resort to the ordinary
and usual methods or means comes within the scope of the power, and it will
always be inferred that a testator intended to give his trustee every authority
which is necessary for his declared purpose. Defendant's contention in this
request seems to be amply supported by authority (citing cases).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164 at 341 (1959).
62. See Andrews v. Auditor, 5 Ohio N.P. 123 (1897).
63. Another rule states that the trust document will be read together so that all of
its parts make sense and will effectuate the intent of the testator. Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal.
2d 885, 206 P.2d 360 (1949).
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Intellectually, the application of the general rule to a short
term option to purchase commercial property would completely
ignore the distinctions between long term leases accompanied by
options and short term direct sale options.64 Practically speaking,
it would place trustees in jeopardy of litigation by beneficiaries for
surcharge, or dismissal for failing to sell trust assets.
VI. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
To avoid these pitfalls and to expedite the usually lengthy
process of waiting for individual courts to reach a decision on this
question, several states have enacted statutes authorizing a trustee
to grant options, even though he only has been given an explicit
power to sell. The relevant sections of the statutes of Oklahoma
and Florida read, in part: "[T]he trustee of an express trust is
authorized: to grant options and to sell real property .... ,,65
The statutes of Oklahoma and Florida give the trustee
unlimited power to option and provide that the power to sell
carries with it this additional power. The basis for these statutes
seems to be a legislative recognition that the express power of sale
contained in the trust instrument implies a power to grant
options."6
The New York legislature has recently enacted a statute
which appears to be based upon a recognition of the economic
realities involved in the sale of trust real property today. That
statute provides, in part, that: "Every fiduciary is authorized: to
grant options for the sale of property for a period not exceeding
six months. '6 7
Before enacting this statute, the New York legislature
examined the complex problems facing purchasers of real estate
and the need. for trustees to have powers to participate in these
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 190, comment k (1959) adds, in addition
to the words set forth in note 24, supra:
Under some circumstances, however, it may be proper for the trustee to give
such an option, as where it is prudent to do so and the same could not
otherwise be advantageously made.
If a trustee has power to sell and lease trust property he may make a lease
and give an option to purchase where the property could not otherwise be
advantageously leased or sold.
65. 60 OKL. GEN. STAT. § 175.24(b); THE ANNOT. STAT., CH. 691.03(2).
66. Williams v. Nylund, 268 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1959); Morris v. City of Oklahoma,
299 P.2d 131 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1956).
67. N.Y. E.P.T.L. ART. 11-1.1(b)(7) (McKinney 1967).
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modern transactions. s The essential function performed by this
section of the statute is to consolidate the powers that every
fiduciary possesses by virtue of his designation, whether or not
such powers are expressly conferred upon him by a will or a trust
agreement. However, the legislature was careful to point out that
this section is not intended to make the list of fiduciary powers
exhaustive. 9 Thus, New York has recognized that trustees should
have the flexibility to respond to the complexities of selling real
estate without having a blanket power to dispose of trust property.
New York has based its statute upon a recognition of' the
economic problems of the buyer, although the legislative history
indicates that the statute is also based in part upon a recognition
of the general principle that the power to sell implies a power to
option. 0
The six month maximum period for the option appears to be
a balanced and workable duration in view of today's economic
realities. It provides the trustee with much needed flexibility; at
the same time it protects the benficiary from substantial losses to
the estate from market changes which are inherent in options for
longer periods. More important, the legislature stated that this
subparagraph authorizing a fiduciary to grant options overrides
the sole judicial precedent in New York which had held the grant
of such an option by a trustee void."
In 1959, the state of Washington adopted a trust act giving
the trustee of express' trusts created thereafter (but not
retroactively) the power to purchase or exercise options. 72 The
problems inherent in such a provision are obvious since it is not
retroactively applied to the vast bulk of trusts created before that
date.
Independent of the efforts of these states has been the work
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, which drafted the Uniform Trustee's Powers Act in 1964.71
The Act was later adopted by the American Bar Association. This
statute specifically gives a trustee whose trust instrument is silent
68. See Hoffman, Practice Commentary, N.Y. E.P.T.L. ART. 11-1 at pp. 9-16
(McKinney 1967).
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id. at 12.
71. In re Armory Board, 29 Misc. 174, 60 N.Y.S. 882 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
72. VASH. STAT. CH. 124 (1959).
73. UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS AcT § 3(c)(12). The exercise of such a power is
specifically made subject to the standards of care discussed in the text.
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on the question of an option, the power to grant an option
involving the disposition of any trust asset. This statute has been
adopted in a few states,7 but its effect has not been felt in the
larger states where most of the trust instruments are created and
carried out.
VI I. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
The general rule that a trustee may not, in the absence of an
express authority, grant options to buy trust real estate is
predicated upon the proposition that the option prevents the
trustee from deciding, at the time of the sale, whether or not such
a transaction would be the most beneficial method of disposition
of the trust property. This rule finds additional support in the
facts that the terms of the sale, and particularly the price, are
decided at a time when conditions may be considerably different
from those which exist when the sale is completed.
This reasoning may be valid when applied to cases in which
an option is not used as a business device to effectuate a sale, but
is simply an ancillary part of a long term lease. It has no
application, however, when one considers the modern economic
realities involved in the sale of trust real estate, particularly for
the purchase of large amounts of real property. Some form of
option or short term escrow is necessary in order to permit the
buyer to engage in various engineering studies, permit marketing
research, conform to master planning, work out utility problems,
obtain public relations, advertising commitments and secure the
necessary financing.
Certain legislatures have made a judgment that a six month
period is reasonable. The duration necessary to accomplish these
and other economic studies is unclear. However, it seems logical
that a short term cut-off point is a compromise solution, serving
the interests of both the trustee, whose ability to dispose of the
property is enhanced, and of the beneficiaries who are protected
against having their estate tied up for long periods at a fixed
offering price.
The immediate answer to this problem would seem to be to
permit a short term escrow, thereby avoiding a decision on
74. IDAHO CODE § 68-106 (Bobbs-Merril (1949); MIss. CODE ANN. § 672-
123(c)(12) (Harrison 1966); GEN. STAT. N.C. § 32-37 (Michie 1965); Wyo. STAT. § 4-
38(10) (Michie 1957); 30 REV. CODE OF WASH. CH. 99 § 070(6) (1965).
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whether or not the basic power to sell includes the power to
option. But the courts will not enforce the claim of a seller who
seeks to retain a so-called good faith deposit placed in escrow by
the purchaser. Accordingly, it is in the best interests of the estate
and the trustee to grant an option instead of opening an escrow,
so that at least the option deposit money can be retained if the
buyer decides not to complete the purchase.
The question whether or not a power to sell carries with it a
power to option can be answered in the affirmative by two
approaches. First, the legislatures and courts could conclude that
the power to sell includes the power to option as one of its
inherent characteristics. Trustees are generally given the power to
take all steps which in their judgment and discretion seem
necessary to protect and conserve the interests of the trust. The
power to option in many circumstances can be viewed as an
ordinary and usual business device falling within the scope of that
power. It is logical that the settlor intended to give his trustee the
authority which is necessary for the declared purposes in the trust,
and the use of an option is necessary to complete many business
transactions involving trust property.
Second, and not necessarily as a separate basis from the first,
the courts and legislatures could decide that a trustee with the
power to sell has the power to option in view of the economic
realities involved in the disposition of trust property, particularly
in the sale of large pieces of real estate. The New York legislature
apparently has recognized both of these reasons in its recent
statute.
The recognition that a power of sale carries with it a power
to option in all cases, is, of course, a much larger step to take
than to simply hold that in view of the economic realities of the
situation at hand, the particular option granted was necessary.
But to go only part way, deciding each case on an ad hoc basis,
would place trustees in a precarious position; they must decide not
only whether they have the power to option trust property, but
also whether or not an option should be used in the particular
case, even though in their view that transaction economically is
the more favorable method of disposition. This would lead to the
anomalous result of removing the burden of proof from those
attacking the conduct of the trustee and placing the burden on the
trustee to prove that the option was the most advantageous
method of disposition as distinguished from any other type of
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device. Trustees who refuse to assume that burden and use an
option may be faced with a suit for surcharge or removal for
failing to act in the best interests of the estate. To avoid this
dilemma and to keep the burden of proof on those attacking the
conduct of the trustees, where it belongs, it is submitted that the
courts and legislatures should take the complete step and hold that
when the trustee is trying to complete a sale, rather than a long
term lease, the power to sell does carry with it the power to
option, at least for some minimum duration.
